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esearchers have convincingly demonstrated
that value strategies can be used to predict
stock returns. For instance, Fama and French (1992)
showed that value strategies based on a ﬁrm’s ratio
of book-to-market value of equity (BV/MV) have
power to forecast stock returns. Similarly, Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) showed that
value strategies based on a ﬁrm’s cash-ﬂow-to-
price ratio (C/P) have power to forecast stock
returns. Although conﬂicting explanations have
been offered for the success of these strategies, the
empirical evidence that they have worked is quite
strong.
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Researchers have also convincingly demon-
strated that momentum strategies have power to
predict stock returns. For instance, Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) showed that strategies that buy win-
ners and sell losers based on returns over the pre-
vious 6–12 months generate excess returns. Asness
(1995) showed that these strategies are effective
even after accounting for common value measures.
In particular, they are most effective when the def-
inition of momentum excludes returns over the
most recent month.
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 The evidence that momentum
strategies work is convincing. As with the value
strategies, however, the explanation of why they
work is largely incomplete.
For this study, we examined whether value
and momentum strategies are independent or
related, asking how well value strategies work
among stocks that have exhibited both strong
momentum (winners) and weak momentum (los-
ers). Similarly, we looked at momentum strategies
among only high-value (cheap) or only low-value
(expensive) stocks. We found that value works, in
general, but that it is particularly strong among
loser stocks and quite weak among winner stocks.
Momentum also works, in general, but is particu-
larly strong among expensive stocks.
Our ﬁndings do not help distinguish between
rational and irrational asset pricing. Consider our
observation that value does not work for winner
stocks. Assume ﬁrst that value strategies work
because variables such as book-to-market ratio are
related to an underlying priced distress factor (the
rational pricing case). In this case, BV/MV is cer-
tainly not a true risk-factor loading but simply a
noisy proxy for such a loading. Conditional on a
ﬁrm having a high BV/MV, it is likely to be dis-
tressed and thus load strongly on the risk factor
related to distress. Also possible, however, is that
conditional on a ﬁrm jointly having a high BV/MV
and high recent return, it is unlikely to be dis-
tressed. In other words, strong recent returns indi-
cate that distress is unlikely no matter what the BV/
MV. Because this ﬁrm is not distressed, it does not
load strongly on the distress factor and has no
corresponding expected return premium over win-
ners with lower BV/MVs. Put differently, winners,
no matter what their BV/MVs, are not generally
distressed. Thus, our results can be consistent with
BV/MV being a noisy proxy for a distress factor in
a rational asset-pricing model.
Next, assume that value strategies work not
 
Value and momentum strategies both have demonstrated power to predict the cross-
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because of rational pricing of risk but because
investors are “uncomfortable” with holding the
assets found cheap by value measures (one version
of the irrational case). Investors willing to hold
these uncomfortable assets receive an expected
return premium. Also possible is that no matter
what an asset’s BV/MV, investors are never
uncomfortable with recent winners, and hence,
owning these stocks does not earn a return pre-
mium. Because our results can ﬁt both explana-
tions, they do not distinguish between the rational
and irrational stories for the success of value and
momentum strategies. Our results, however, do
add to the set of stylized facts that the ultimate
explanation must cover.
In general, value and momentum are related,
and the cross-section of expected stock returns is
more complicated than previously thought.
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
 
We ran tests on monthly data from July 1963
through December 1994 on all NYSE, Amex, and
Nasdaq ﬁrms with the necessary CRSP and Com-
pustat data.
A stock’s PAST(2,12) is its average monthly
return during the past 12 months, excluding the
most recent one. A stock’s MV is the CRSP-
calculated number of shares outstanding times
price per share, both measured at the end of the
prior month. A stock’s BV is the ﬁrm’s book value
of common equity for the prior year. BV is updated
in July to include data only up through the prior
December. Thus, the lag between its measurement
and our tests is sufﬁcient to ensure that our trading
strategies contain little, if any, “look-ahead bias.”
A stock’s log(BV/MV) is the logged ratio of these
quantities. A stock’s D/P is the total value of its
common dividends last year divided by MV. Like
BV, D is measured with a December-to-July lag.
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Both log(BV/MV) and D/P are variables com-
monly used in value strategies. Asness and Stevens
(1995) showed that value strategies are generally
more effective when variables are measured within
industries. Intraindustry measurement means that
when measuring a ﬁrm’s log(BV/MV) or D/P, we
subtracted the value-weighted average of the
log(BV/MV)s or D/Ps for that ﬁrm’s industry. We
deﬁned 49 industries as in Fama and French (1994a)
and Asness and Stevens and constructed intrain-
dustry measures of log(BV/MV) and D/P. Thus, on
our scale, a value stock is one with high log(BV/
MV) or D/P relative to its industry.
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We constructed value-weighted portfolios
based on three variables: PAST(2,12), industry-
relative log(BV/MV), and industry-relative D/P.
For each month, we sorted all NYSE ﬁrms indepen-
dently on each of the variables into ﬁve portfolios.
We then placed each NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq ﬁrm
into one of the quintiles based on the NYSE
breakpoints. Tables 1 through 3 report the average
monthly return on each value-weighted portfolio,
the summed full-period beta from regressing each
quintile’s return on the value-weighted NYSE/
Amex/Nasdaq portfolio (contemporaneous and
lagged one month), the average value-weighted
size ﬁrm in each quintile (averages are over each
month and each ﬁrm), the average value-weighted
log(BV/MV) for each quintile, the average value-
weighted D/P for each quintile, and the average
value-weighted PAST(2,12) for each quintile.
We also formed intersections of the above
quintile portfolios. For example, 25 portfolios were
based on the intersection of PAST(2,12) and intrain-
dustry log(BV/MV) breakpoints. These results are
reported in Tables 4 and 5.
 
UNIVARIATE TESTS
 
We ﬁrst examined the properties of value-weighted
quintile portfolios formed by sorting on each
variable individually. Table 1 reports results for the
PAST(2,12) variable. The last column contains the
difference in average return between 
 
Q
 
5 (highest
PAST[2,12] ﬁrms) and 
 
Q
 
1 (lowest PAST[2,12] ﬁrms)
and a 
 
t
 
-statistic testing if the mean return is zero.
This table reconﬁrms the results of Jegadeesh
and Titman (1993) and Asness (1995). Returns are
increasing in past recent returns (
 
Q
 
5 has 0.87 percent
higher average monthly return than 
 
Q
 
1), and this
 
Table 1. Sorting on PAST(2,12)
 
Statistic
 
Q
 
1
 
Q
 
2
 
Q
 
3
 
Q
 
4
 
Q
 
5
 
Q
 
5 – 
 
Q
 
1 
(
 
t
 
-Statistic)
Monthly return 0.61% 0.80% 0.81% 1.09% 1.48% 0.87% 
Beta 1.14 0.92 0.96 0.93 1.17 (3.73)
Size (millions) $5,879 $9,207 $9,418 $9,323 $7,963
Log(BV/MV) –0.51 –0.62 –0.73 –0.86 –1.12
D/P 3.90% 3.99% 3.68% 3.19% 2.15%
PAST(2,12) –1.52% 0.01% 1.12% 2.29% 4.64% 
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relationship is statistically signiﬁcant. Beta shows a
small U-shaped relation to PAST(2,12), and size has
a corresponding inverted U-shape. Log(BV/MV),
and to a lesser extent D/P, is falling
 
 
 
in PAST(2,12).
Part of this decline is by construction. Dividends
and book value were measured over the prior ﬁscal
year with a measurement lag from December until
July. If true current D/P and BV/MV were unrelated
to PAST(2,12), our reported D/P and BV/MV might
still be related to PAST(2,12) because of PAST(2,12)’s
connection with D/P and BV/MV’s denominator
(i.e., MV is positively related to recent return).
Finally, by construction, 
 
Q
 
1 through 
 
Q
 
5 show
monotonically increasing PAST(2,12).
In Table 2, returns are increasing in log(BV/
MV), and this increase is statistically signiﬁcant.
Betas are somewhat U-shaped. After 
 
Q
 
1, average
ﬁrm size is falling in log(BV/MV). By construction,
log(BV/MV) is increasing across the quintiles. Sim-
ilarly, D/P is also increasing in log(BV/MV), but
PAST(2,12) is falling. Log(BV/MV) and PAST(2,12)
are both positively and signiﬁcantly associated
with future returns, yet they are negatively associ-
ated with each other.
For the univariate sorts on D/P (Table 3),
returns are increasing in D/P, but this increase is
weak relative to that of the other variables.
 
 Q
 
1 to
 
Q
 
4 exhibit ﬂat average returns, with returns ﬁnally
increasing at 
 
Q
 
5. The 
 
Q
 
5–
 
Q
 
1 spread is 31 basis
points a month, which is marginally signiﬁcant.
Thus, univariately, industry-relative dividend
yield is a weaker predictive variable than is BV/
MV. Beta is generally falling in D/P. Firm size is
shaped like an inverted U—both the highest and
lowest D/P ﬁrms are generally smaller than the
others. Sorting on industry-relative D/P induces
no relation in log(BV/MV) for 
 
Q
 
1 to 
 
Q
 
3 but has an
increasing relation for 
 
Q
 
4 and 
 
Q
 
5. Industry-relative
D/P is negatively related to PAST(2,12).
We drew two conclusions from the univariate
tests. First, each variable is univariately positively
associated with future expected returns (the relation
is marginal for D/P). Second, the value variables
(log[BV/MV], D/P) and momentum (PAST[2,12]),
are positively associated with future expected
returns but negatively associated with each other.
 
SORTING ON BOTH VARIABLES
 
The empirical evidence that value strategies work is
convincing. Value measures are negatively associ-
ated with momentum, however, which is itself pos-
itively associated with returns. In such a case, we
would expect value to work better as a predictor of
returns holding momentum constant and momen-
tum to work better holding value constant. We do
not, however, necessarily expect these marginal
relations to differ across varying momentum or
value quintiles. Sorting on two variables at once, we
tested whether the two strategies are each stronger
holding the other constant and whether the mar-
ginal relations do in fact vary.
Table 4 reports results of sorting ﬁrms on both
PAST(2,12) and intraindustry log(BV/MV). That is,
we took the intersection of the PAST(2,12) and
log(BV/MV) quintiles to form 25 value-weighted
portfolios with monthly returns from July 1963 to
December 1994. For instance, the upper left entry
in Table 4 represents the portfolio of ﬁrms that fall
into the lowest value quintile and the lowest
momentum quintile each month. 
 
 
 
   
 
Table 2. Sorting on Industry-Relative Log(BV/MV)
 
Statistic
 
Q
 
1
 
Q
 
2
 
Q
 
3
 
Q
 
4
 
Q
 
5
 
Q
 
5 – 
 
Q
 
1 
(
 
t
 
-Statistic)
Monthly return 0.85% 0.89% 0.98% 1.24% 1.36% 0.51% 
Beta 1.09 0.88 0.86 1.09 1.22 (3.18)
Size (millions) $9,811 $13,618 $7,254 $3,386 $3,325
Log(BV/MV) –1.47 –0.85 –0.43 –0.19 0.17
D/P 2.04% 3.29% 4.13% 4.14% 6.54%
PAST(2,12) 2.13% 1.41% 1.10% 0.89% 0.66%
 
Table 3. Sorting on Industry-Relative D/P
 
Statistic
 
Q
 
1
 
Q
 
2
 
Q
 
3
 
Q
 
4
 
Q
 
5
 
Q
 
5 – 
 
Q
 
1 
(
 
t
 
-Statistic)
Monthly return 0.92% 0.91% 0.87% 0.97% 1.23% 0.31% 
Beta 1.22 1.05 0.96 0.84 0.93 (2.10)
Size (millions) $2,697 $8,303 $12,564 $9,522 $6,658
Log(BV/MV) –1.01 –1.08 –0.96 –0.52 –0.09
D/P 1.16% 1.94% 2.93% 4.53% 7.62%
PAST(2,12) 2.17% 1.85% 1.52% 0.98% 0.53% 
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For each of these 25 portfolios, we report four
measures: the average monthly return, the average
value-weighted log(BV/MV), the average value-
weighted D/P, and the average value-weighted
PAST(2,12). The last column and the last row report
the results of 
 
t
 
-tests of speciﬁc long/short portfo-
lios. These correspond to the long/short portfolio
tests reported in Tables 1 through 3, but in Table 4,
the long and short portfolios are formed only over
single quintiles of the other variable. For instance,
the top right entry in Table 4 is 0.97 percent, which
means that a long/short portfolio that is long the
highest quintile of log(BV/MV) and short the low-
est quintile of log(BV/MV), building this long/
short portfolio using only ﬁrms in the lowest quin-
tile of PAST(2,12), returned an average of 97 basis
points a month. In other words, this entry reports
tests of a value strategy across only the past year’s
loser ﬁrms, whereas Table 2 tested a value strategy
across all ﬁrms. Similarly, the bottom left entry,
containing 1.47 percent, reﬂects tests of a momen-
tum strategy across only the most expensive ﬁrms.
The other entries are deﬁned accordingly.
The spread in average return between log(BV/
MV) and any of the bottom four PAST(2,12) quin-
tiles is larger and statistically more signiﬁcant than
the spread for all ﬁrms (Table 2). In contrast, the
return spread induced by log(BV/MV) is almost
nonexistent for the highest quintile of PAST(2,12)
ﬁrms (winners).
If value and momentum are negatively related,
and each is univariately positively related to stock
returns, then value should work better if momen-
tum is held relatively constant. Thus, the results for
the winner quintile are surprising. Looking across
the highest PAST(2,12) quintile (the winner row in
Table 4), sorting on log(BV/MV) produces a spread
in actual log(BV/MV) (the second entry under the
winner category) comparable to, if not larger than,
the spread across other rows. In the case of these
highest PAST(2,12) ﬁrms, however, a comparable
spread in average return is missing (it is only 0.13
percent and statistically insigniﬁcant). Essentially,
 
Table 4. Sorting on PAST(2,12) and Log(BV/MV) within Industry
 
Average Value-Weighted 
Statistic
 
Q
 
1 
(Expensive 
Log[BV/MV])
 
Q
 
2
 
Q
 
3
 
Q
 
4
 
Q
 
5
(Cheap Log
[BV/MV])
 
Q
 
5 – 
 
Q
 
1 
(
 
t
 
-Statistic)
 
a
 
Loser PAST(2,12)
 
Monthly return 0.03% 0.49% 0.80% 0.83% 1.00% 0.97%
Log(BV/MV) –1.24 –0.72 –0.36 –0.12 0.29 (4.38)
D/P 2.31% 3.28% 4.07% 4.34% 6.04%
PAST(2,12) –0.92 –1.63 –1.72 –1.90 –2.27
 
Q2
 
Monthly return 0.61% 0.59% 0.90% 1.25% 1.35% 0.74%
Log(BV/MV) –1.23 –0.72 –0.37 –0.13 0.20 (3.57)
D/P 2.62% 3.66% 4.45% 4.55% 6.70%
PAST(2/12) 0.03 0.03 –0.01 –0.02 –0.04
 
Q3
 
Monthly return 0.52% 0.93% 0.80% 1.19% 1.44% 0.92%
Log(BV/MV) –1.31 –0.78 –0.41 –0.18 0.19 (4.94)
D/P 2.40% 3.55% 4.29% 4.24% 6.98%
PAST(2/12) 1.12 1.13 1.11 1.10 1.10
 
Q4
 
Monthly return 0.99% 0.97% 1.17% 1.45% 1.68% 0.69%
Log(BV/MV) –1.42 –0.85 –0.49 –0.24 0.10 (3.39)
D/P 2.02% 3.13% 3.80% 3.80% 6.35%
PAST(2/12) 2.32 2.28 2.26 2.27 2.28
 
Winner PAST(2,12)
 
Monthly return 1.50% 1.44% 1.49% 1.60% 1.62% 0.13%
Log(BV/MV) –1.64 –0.88 –0.60 –0.35 0.13 (0.65)
D/P 1.32% 2.32% 2.69% 2.80% 6.34%
PAST(2/12) 5.01 4.34 4.31 4.35 4.47
Return difference  1.47 0.95 0.69 0.76 0.62
 
(t
 
-Statistic)
 
b
 
(5.71) (3.47) (2.66) (3.10) (2.57)
 
a
 
Zero-investment portfolio that is long the 
 
Q
 
5 column entry for each row and short the 
 
Q
 
1 column entry for that row; that is, it
tests a long/short portfolio strategy based on the column variable that attempts to hold the row variable constant. We report the
average return on this long/short portfolio strategy and the 
 
t
 
-statistic for the test of whether this average return is zero.
 
b
 
Test similar to that described in Footnote a but for long/short portfolios formed on the row variable that attempt to hold the
column variable constant. 
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value does not seem to work well for winner ﬁrms,
despite the fact that our value measure differs sub-
stantially among these ﬁrms.
 
5
 
The result is similar for momentum strategies
across different value quintiles. Although momen-
tum works within all value quintiles, it is much
stronger for the most expensive ﬁrms (the second
column of Table 4). Furthermore, these stronger
momentum results are present even though the
spread in actual momentum (the fourth row within
each cell) among low-value ﬁrms is, if anything,
smaller than the momentum spread among high-
value ﬁrms.
Figures 1 through 3 present these results graph-
ically. Figure 1 plots the average return to each of the
25 portfolios. Clearly, returns are strongly increas-
ing with value for loser ﬁrms. Sorting on value,
however, produces very little spread in average
return for winner ﬁrms. Sorting on momentum pro-
duces a very steep ascent in average return among
expensive stocks. This ascent, however, is consid-
erably slower among stocks that are cheap on the
log(BV/MV) scale.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot the log(BV/MV)
and PAST(2,12), respectively, on each portfolio.
The sorting technique appears to be generally
effective. Within log(BV/MV) quintiles, sorting
on PAST(2,12) produces very little spread in
log(BV/MV). Similarly, within PAST(2,12) quin-
tiles, sorting on log(BV/MV) produces very little
spread in PAST(2,12).
 
6
 
Two empirical results are of particular interest.
First, value is generally a good strategy but it is
weak among ﬁrms with strong momentum. Sec-
ond, momentum is generally a good strategy, par-
ticularly among ﬁrms with low value. In general,
 
Figure 1. Return Surface for PAST(2,12) and 
Log(BV/MV) Portfolios
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Figure 2. Log(BV/MV) Surface for PAST(2,12) 
and Log(BV/MV) Portfolios
Figure 3. PAST(2,12) Surface for PAST(2,12) and 
Log(BV/MV) Portfolios
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each of these strategies is nearly monotonically
weaker among stocks found increasingly attractive
by the other strategy.
These results are interesting, but are they sta-
tistically signiﬁcant? We tested this question in the
following way. First, the different cells in Table 4 are
denoted as, for example, (
 
Qm,Qv
 
), which is the
portfolio that is the intersection of the 
 
Qm
 
 momen-
tum portfolio and the 
 
Qv
 
 value portfolio. That is,
(
 
Q
 
1,
 
Q
 
1) is the portfolio with low momentum and
low value, (
 
Q
 
1,
 
Q
 
5) is the portfolio with low
momentum and high value, and so forth.
Using that notation, we examined two differ-
ent long/short strategies:
 
(
 
Q
 
5,
 
Q
 
1) – (
 
Q
 
1,
 
Q
 
1) = a strategy long winners and 
short losers over only expen-
sive ﬁrms, and
(
 
Q
 
5,
 
Q
 
5) – (
 
Q
 
1,
 
Q
 
5) = a strategy long winners and 
short losers over only cheap 
ﬁrms.
 
The results of Table 4 indicate that momentum
works better within poor-value ﬁrms. Using our
notation, two different long/short strategies can be
compared by looking at the following more com-
plicated long/short portfolio (our hypothesis is
that this portfolio has positive expected return):
 
[(
 
Q
 
5,
 
Q
 
1) – (
 
Q
 
1,
 
Q
 
1)] – [(
 
Q
 
5,
 
Q
 
5) – (
 
Q
 
1,
 
Q
 
5)] > 0.
Similarly, we can test whether value strategies
are truly weaker for ﬁrms with strong momentum:
[(Q5,Q5) – (Q5,Q1)] – [(Q1,Q5) – (Q1,Q1)] < 0.
A simple manipulation shows that these two con-
structs are equivalent.
We can also view this hypothesis in the follow-
ing manner:
[(Q5,Q5) + (Q1,Q1)] – [(Q5,Q1) + (Q1,Q5)] < 0.
Our test is whether this long/short portfolio has
average returns of less than zero. Viewed in the
form above, this test amounts to testing how the
effect of increasing both momentum and value
compares with the effect of increasing them one at
a time. We found that [(Q5,Q5) + (Q1,Q1)]  –
[(Q5,Q1) + (Q1,Q5)] had an average return of –0.85
percent a month and a t-statistic of –3.50.
This statistically signiﬁcant result may be
explained in one of three equivalent ways:
• The value strategy is statistically signiﬁcantly
stronger over loser ﬁrms than over winner
ﬁrms.
• The momentum strategy is statistically signiﬁ-
cantly stronger over expensive ﬁrms than over
cheap ﬁrms.
• Increasing both momentum and value simulta-
neously has a signiﬁcantly weaker effect on
stock returns than the average of the marginal
effects of increasing them separately.
We next conducted similar tests for dividend
yields measured relative to industry averages
(Table 5). The results for D/P are even more striking
than those for log(BV/MV). Recall that differences
in D/P can only marginally explain differences in
returns across all ﬁrms (Table 3). This result, how-
ever, masks a much stronger relation. For all but the
ﬁrms with the strongest recent momentum, sorting
on industry-relative D/P produces economically
and statistically strong return differentials among
value-weighted portfolios. Indeed, for recent loser
ﬁrms (the Q1 row), sorting on D/P produces a
monthly return of 92 basis points and a t-statistic of
4.62. For a ﬁrm that has exhibited bottom-quintile
recent returns, dividend yields are a strong indica-
tor of future returns.
The effect of PAST(2,12) strategies among
D/P quintiles is similar to that among log(BV/
MV) quintiles. PAST(2,12) strategies work, in
general, but they are far superior among ﬁrms
with low industry-relative D/Ps. Among these
low-dividend-yield ﬁrms, sorting on momentum
induces a monthly return spread of 153 basis
points and a t-statistic of 5.81.
These differences are statistically signiﬁcant;
[(Q5,Q5) + (Q1,Q1)] – [(Q5,Q1) + (Q1,Q5)] had an
average return of –0.77 percent a month and a
t-statistic of –3.08. Momentum works better among
low-D/P ﬁrms, and D/P works better among ﬁrms
with poor momentum and does not work at all
among ﬁrms with top-quintile momentum.
CONCLUSION
Both value and momentum strategies are effective,
although value measures and momentum mea-
sures are negatively correlated. Thus, pursuing a
value strategy entails, to some extent, buying ﬁrms
with poor momentum. Equivalently, buying ﬁrms
with good momentum entails, to some extent, pur-
suing a poor-value strategy. In most cases, holding
momentum constant leads to a more effective value
strategy. That is, the value strategy works best
when not forced to short the effective momentum
strategy. Similarly, holding value constant leads to
a generally superior momentum strategy. In itself,
this ﬁnding is interesting but not surprising. The
interrelation, however, goes deeper.
The relations of value and momentum to
future returns are not simply stronger holding the
other variable constant; they are conditional upon
each other. Value works, in general, but largely fails
for  ﬁrms with strong momentum. Momentum
works, in general, but is particularly strong for
expensive ﬁrms. 
The spread in ex post average return produced
by sorting on value measures differs depending onFinancial Analysts Journal • March/April 1997 35
the level of momentum. Nevertheless, in our actual
measures of value, the spread produced by sorting
on value does not vary signiﬁcantly depending
upon the level of momentum. Similarly, the spread
in ex post average return induced by sorting on
momentum varies depending on value, but the
induced spread in actual momentum from sorting
on momentum does not vary considerably among
value quintiles.
The effect of momentum on a dividend yield
value strategy is particularly startling. Sorting on
industry-relative dividend yield across all ﬁrms
produces at best a weak value strategy. Holding
momentum constant, however, and looking at all
but the largest recent-winner ﬁrms, industry-rela-
tive dividend yield is a very strong predictive vari-
able. For example, looking only at the largest loser
ﬁrms (the ﬁrst row in Table 5), sorting on industry-
relative D/P leads to an average Q5–Q1 spread of
92 basis points a month (t = 4.62) as opposed to the
31 basis point monthly spread (t = 2.10) induced by
sorting on D/P over all ﬁrms (Table 3).
The implication for quantitative investment
strategies is interesting. Assume that the relative
performance of a portfolio manager is measured
against an index and that the manager attempts to
maximize the trade-off between higher expected
outperformance and lower volatility of outperfor-
mance (tracking error). Further assume that the
manager is forming his or her portfolio based on
two variables: a measure of value and a measure of
momentum. In general, optimization techniques
will trade off achieving higher measures of value
and momentum (maximizing expected outperfor-
mance) against the goal of a more diversiﬁed port-
folio (minimizing tracking error). Recognizing the
relation described in this paper could lead an opti-
mizer to own more expensive winners and cheap
losers, because moving from, for instance, expen-
sive winners to cheap winners corresponds to low
marginal expected return. At this point, these prac-
tical implications are conjecture. More research on
this topic is clearly appropriate.
Table 5. Sorting on PAST(2,12) and D/P within Industry
Average Value-Weighted Statistic 
Q1 
(Expensive D/P) Q2 Q3 Q4
Q5
(Cheap D/P)
Q5 – Q1 
(t-Statistic)a
Loser PAST(2,12)
Monthly return 0.08% 0.25% 0.61% 0.82% 1.00% 0.92%
Log(BV/MV) –0.63 –0.70 –0.69 –0.40 0.01 (4.62)
D/P 1.02% 1.95% 2.94% 4.39% 8.02%
PAST(2,12) –1.30 –1.90 –1.64 –1.61 –1.83
Q2
Monthly return 0.63% 0.57% 0.80% 0.94% 1.17% 0.54%
Log(BV/MV)  –0.82 –0.84 –0.75 –0.46 –0.08 (2.91)
D/P 1.36% 2.28% 3.25% 4.70% 7.50%
PAST(2,12) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 –0.03
Q3
Monthly return 0.66% 0.75% 0.68% 0.89% 1.33% 0.67%
Log(BV/MV) –0.88 –0.94 –0.86 –0.50 –0.09 (3.80)
D/P 1.46% 2.24% 3.17% 4.53% 7.34%
PAST(2,12) 1.13 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.10
Q4
Monthly return 0.96% 1.03% 1.10% 1.02% 1.48% 0.52%
Log(BV/MV) –0.98 –1.04 –0.95 –0.53 –0.14 (2.87)
D/P 1.31% 2.05% 2.91% 4.21% 7.29%
PAST(2,12) 2.33 2.30 2.31 2.24 2.22
Winner PAST(2,12)
Monthly return 1.61% 1.47% 1.25% 1.56% 1.76% 0.15%
Log(BV/MV) –1.25 –1.24 –1.07 –0.60 –0.07 (0.74)
D/P 0.83% 1.47% 2.34% 3.54% 8.80%
PAST(2,12) 5.25 4.74 4.31 4.12 4.13
Return difference 1.53 1.22 0.64 0.75 0.76
(t-Statistic) (5.81) (4.81) (2.50) (2.90) (2.94)
aZero investment portfolio that is long the Q5 column entry for that row and short the Q1 column entry for that row. That is, it tests a
long/short portfolio strategy based on the column variable that attempts to hold the row variable constant. We report the average
return on this long/short portfolio strategy and the t-statistic for the test of whether this average return is zero.
bTest similar to that described in Footnote a but for long/short portfolios formed on the row variable that attempt to hold the column
variable constant.36 Association for Investment Management and Research
The implications of our results are not clear for
the ongoing controversy over interpreting why
these strategies work. One explanation for the suc-
cess of momentum strategies is that the market is
slow to react to new information. Is this explanation
more or less plausible given that this slowness to
react appears to be considerably more prevalent for
expensive ﬁrms than for inexpensive ones?
Two differing interpretations for why value
strategies work are that value represents risk ver-
sus that the market is inefﬁcient. Value strategies
work well, except among the strongest recent per-
formers. Among the strongest recent performers,
value strategies based on industry-relative BV/MV
or dividend yield are ineffective. Value strategies
might work because of investors’ inability to price
securities correctly (e.g., investors might systemat-
ically overextrapolate good or bad past results). Is
it plausible that investors’ abilities are much better
among recent winners than among recent losers?
Do investors misprice bad news more than good
news?
Lakonishok et al. (1994) offered one possible
explanation for the efﬁcacy of value strategies:
Investors might wish to avoid owning stocks with
good value because of the perception that those are
bad companies. Perhaps no such stigma applies to
recent winners, no matter what their valuation
measures indicate. In that case, we might expect
our observed result: Value strategies largely fail
among winners because the premium to owning
bad companies is nonexistent. That is, there are no
bad companies among recent winners. Unfortu-
nately, a parallel story exists for the hypothesis of
Fama and French (1992, 1993): Value works because
it proxies for an underlying factor related to dis-
tress. Because our value measures are only proxies,
the proxies could be better for loser ﬁrms than for
winner ﬁrms.
The relation between value and momentum
effects appears to be a strong one. These results
apply directly to implementing quantitative invest-
ment strategies. The interpretation of these results
will be the topic for future debate.7
NOTES
1. In general, explanations fall into three camps. One group,
typified by Fama and French (1992, 1993), argues that value
strategies work because they represent some underlying risk
that is higher for value stocks, for which compensation must
be made. The second camp, typified by Lakonishok et al.
(1994) and Haugen (1995), believes that value strategies work
because investors systematically make errors in their
forecasts or because investors are uncomfortable holding
value stocks. The third group, typified by Black (1993),
believes that nothing really works and all of the above is data
mining.
2. Defining the momentum strategy in this way avoids
measurement problems induced by the bid–ask spread
(Asness 1995).
3. We included firms with zero dividends in our tests. Excluding
these firms has no substantial impact on our inferences.
4. This article’s conclusions are strengthened but not changed
by measuring the value variables intraindustry.
5. The log(BV/MV) and D/P entries in Table 4 and Table 5 are
raw values, not industry adjusted. The spreads in industry-
adjusted log(BV/MV) and D/P also do not vary
substantially among the PAST(2,12) quintiles.
6. An exception is that sorting on log(BV/MV) among only
loser firms (Q1 momentum firms) produces a negative
spread in PAST(2,12). That is, cheaper firms within the recent
loser quintile are even bigger recent losers. Of course, this
result means value should work worse within this quintile,
but in fact, it works better.
7. I would like to thank Kent Clark, Eugene Fama, Britt Harris,
Brian Hurst, Bob Jones, Bob Krail, John Liew, Rex Sinquefield,
and Ross Stevens for extremely helpful comments.
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